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Abstract
We explore the conversion of classical secret-sharing
schemes to quantum ones, and how this can be used
to give efficient qss schemes for general adversary
structures. Our first result is that quantum secret-
sharing is possible for any structure for which no
two disjoint sets can reconstruct the secret (this was
also proved, somewhat differently, in [7]). To obtain
this we show that a large class of linear classical ss
schemes can be converted into quantum schemes of
the same efficiency.
We also give a necessary and sufficient condiion
for the direct conversion of classical schemes into
quantum ones, and show that all group homomorphic
schemes satisfy it.
1 Introduction
A classical secret sharing scheme is a (usually) ran-
domized encoding of a secret s into a n-tuple, the co-
ordinates of which are each given to different players
in the player set P . The encoding is a secret sharing
scheme if there exists a collection A of subsets of P
(called the adversary structure) such that no set of
players in A gets any information about s from their
shares, but any set of players not in A will be able
to compute s. The classic example of this is due to
Shamir [11]. He gives a construction based on poly-
nomials over a finite field of a threshold secret-sharing
scheme for any threshold t and any number of players
(in such a scheme, A = {B ⊆ P : |B| ≤ t}).
The idea of sharing quantum secrets was first de-
scribed and solved for the case t = 1, n = 2 by Hillery
et al. in [8]1. A more general solution, for all t > n2−1,
∗Work done while author was at McGill University, Mon-
treal. Supported by an NSERC undergraduate research grant.
1In fact, [8] shows how efficency can be gained in the in-
secure channels model by combining the key distribution and
secret-sharing layers of the protocol. An even more efficient
protocol was suggested in [10].
was recently given by Cleve et al. (CGL, [4]). Their
scheme is a direct generalization of the well-known
Shamir scheme [11], with all calculations done unitar-
ily and “at the quantum level”, i. e. replacing random
choices with equal superpositions over those choices.
In next section we give definitions and back-
ground. In section 3, we then prove that classical
linear secret-sharing schemes, with an appropriate
adversary structure, can be converted into quantum
schemes with the same complexity, both in terms of
share size and encoding/reconstruction. This gives
another proof of theorem 8 from [7]. In the last sec-
tion, we give a necessary and sufficient condition for
(not necessarily linear) classical ss schemes to become
quantum ones when run at the quantum level, and ob-
serve that all group homomorphic schemes obey this
condition.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Adversary structures
Given a set of players P , an adversary structure
A over P is a set of subsets of players which is
downward-closed under inclusion:
(B ∈ A and B′ ⊆ B) =⇒ B′ ∈ A.
Normally such a structure is used to represent the
collection of all coalitions of players which a given
protocol can tolerate without losing security: as long
as the set of cheating players is in A, the cheaters
cannot breach the security of the protocol.
Secret-sharing schemes usually tolerate threshold
structures, which are of the form A = {B ⊆ P : |B| ≤
t} for some t. However, when working with more gen-
eral structures, the following definitions prove useful.
Definition 1 An adversary structure A ⊆ 2P is Q2
if no two sets in A cover P , that is
6 ∃B1, B2 ∈ A : B1 ∪B2 = P.
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Definition 2 The dual of an adversary structure A
over P is the collection
A∗ = {B ⊆ P : Bc /∈ A}
where Bc denotes the complement P −B.
Definition 3 A structure A over P is Q2∗ if its dual
A∗ is Q2. This means that any two sets not in A will
have a non-empty intersection.
It is interesting to note that A is Q2 iff A ⊆ A∗.
Dually, A is Q2∗ iff A ⊇ A∗. Consequently, a collec-
tion is self-dual iff it is both Q2 and Q2∗.
2.1.1 Monotone functions
We can define a partial order on {0, 1}n by the rule
“x ≤ y iff each coordinate of x is smaller than the
corresponding coordinate of y.”
By identifying {0, 1}n with 2{1,... ,n}, the relation ≤
on {0, 1}n corresponds to inclusion (⊆) in 2{1,... ,n}.
Then a monotone function f corresponds to a func-
tion from 2{1,... ,n} to {0, 1} such that A ⊆ B =⇒
f(A) ≤ f(B).
Such a monotone function f naturally defines an
adversary structure Af = f
−1({0}) = {B ⊆ P :
f(B) = 0}. Moreover, f is called Q2 (resp. Q2∗) iff
Af is Q
2 (or Q2∗).
2.2 Monotone span programs
Span programs were introduced as a model of com-
putation in [9]. They were first used for multiparty
protocols in [5] under this name, although a similar
construction, attributed to Brickell, already existed
([12]). In this section we define some concepts re-
lated to monotone span programs.
Definition 4 A monotone span program (MSP)
over a set P is a triple (K,M,ψ) where K is a finite
field, M is a d×e matrix over K and ψ : {1, . . . , d} →
P is a function which effectively labels each row of M
by a member of P .
The MSP associates to each subset B ⊆ P a subset
of the rows ofM : the set of rows l such that ψ(l) ∈ B.
This corresponds to a linear subspace ofKe (the span
of those rows). The monotone function f : 2P →
{0, 1} defined by a MSP is given by the rule “f(B) =
1 if and only if the target vector ǫ = (1, 0, 0, . . . , 0)
is in the subspace associated with B”. If we denote
byMB the submatrix of M formed of the rows l such
that ψ(l) ∈ B then we get that
f(B) = 1 ⇐⇒ ǫ ∈ Im(MTB ).
In fact, given any monotone function f , we can
construct a MSP which computes it. The size of the
MSP will be at most proportional to the size of the
smallest monotone threshold formula for f , but may
in some cases be exponentially smaller [1, 5].
The proof uses the following fact from linear alge-
bra. Here the dual of a vector subspaceW is denoted
W⊥ = {u : u⊤w = 0 ∀w ∈W}.
Remark: Denote the dual of a vector subspace W
by W⊥ = {u : u⊤w = 0 ∀w ∈ W}. For any
matrix M we have Im(M⊤) = ker(M)⊥. Thus,
f(B) = 0 iff ∃v :MBv = 0 and ǫ
⊤v 6= 0.
2.2.1 Secret-sharing from MSP’s
Given a MSP (K,M,ψ), we can define a classical
secret sharing scheme which tolerates the adversary
structure Af induced by the MSP. Say the dealer has
a secret s ∈ K. He extends it to an e-rowed vector
by adding random field elements a2, . . . , ae to make
a vector s∗ = (s, a2, . . . , ae). The dealer gives the
lth component of sˆ = Ms∗ to player Pψ(l). If sˆA
denotes the elements of sˆ with indices in A where
A ⊆ {1, . . . , d}, then each Pi receives sˆψ−1(i).
The ss scheme thus defined tolerates exactly the
adversary structure Af .
Note that the concept of MSP’s is very general: any
linear secret-sharing scheme (i.e. one in which the
encoding of the secret is given by a linear map over a
field) can be formulated as a MSP-based scheme [5].
The Shamir scheme is a special case, where M is a
n × (k + 1) Vandermonde matrix, e = k + 1, d = n,
and ψ is the identity on {1, . . . , n}.
2.3 Secret sharing with general access
structures
With classical data, secret sharing is possible for any
access structure. Given a monotone threshold for-
mula for a function f , Benaloh and Leichter [2] gave
a construction for Af with efficency proportional to
the size of the formula. This is improved on by con-
structions based on monotone span programs (sec-
tion 2.2.1), which are always at least as efficient
as the Benaloh-Leichter scheme but can be super-
polynomially more so.
When sharing quantum data, the situation is
slightly different. Because of the no-cloning theo-
rem, it is impossible to share secrets with an adver-
sary structure which is not Q2∗ (since then one can
2
find two disjoint sets which can reconstruct the se-
cret based on their shares). Because a pure-state qss
scheme is also a quantum code correcting erasures on
the sets described by its adversary structure, we also
get that any pure-state qss scheme has an adversary
structure which is in fact self-dual [4]. The natural
converse to this is
Theorem 1 Given any Q2∗ structure A, we can find
a qss scheme for A. If A is self-dual, then the
scheme can be a pure-state one.
This was proved for the case of threshold structures
in [4]: their construction works when the number of
cheaters t is more than n2 − 1 (i. e. it takes more
than n2 players to reconstruct the secret). Moreover,
theirs is a pure-state scheme when n = 2t+ 1 (these
correspond to the Q2∗ and self-dual conditions, re-
spectively).
The full theorem was stated but not proved in [4].
We give a proof here, based on monotone span pro-
grams. Another proof, due to Daniel Gottesman and
based on purification of quantum superoperators, ap-
peared in [7].
3 Quantum secret-sharing from
classical linear schemes
We assume that the reader is familiar with the nota-
tion and basic concepts of quantum computing. For
clarity, we will ignore normalization factors.
3.1 Pure-state linear QSS
Cramer et al. [5] pointed out that any linear secret-
sharing scheme can be realized as a MSP-based
scheme. In this section, I show that any MSP
with adversary structure A gives rise to a quantum
erasure-correcting code for erasures occuring on any
set of positions in A∩A∗. In the case where A is self-
dual, this yields a pure-state quantum secret-sharing
scheme for A.
The idea is the same as that for the CGL scheme
[4]. First choose a MSP, say (K,M,ψ). Note that
wlog all e rows of M are linearly independent and
so we can extend M to an invertible d×d matrixM ′.
We can construct a quantum circuit M˜ implementing
multiplication by M ′ and thus encode a basis state
|s〉, for s ∈ K, as
M˜
(
|s〉 ⊗
∑
a∈Ke−1
|a1 · · ·ae−1〉 ⊗ |0 · · · 0〉
)
=
∑
a∈Ke−1
∣∣∣∣M
(
s
a
)〉
(The expression
(
s
a
)
denotes the column vector ob-
tained by adjoining s to the beginning of the vector a).
This scheme can be extended by linearity to ar-
bitrary states |φ〉 =
∑
s∈K αs |s〉. The pieces of the
encoded state are then distributed according to the
function ψ. We have:
Theorem 2 Let (K,M,ψ) be a MSP with a.s. A.
Then the encoding above is corrects erasures on any
set of positions in A ∩A∗.
To prove this, we need to show for any set B which
is in A but whose complement is not, the players
in A can reconstruct the encoded data. We give a
reconstruction procedure. The proof consists of the
two following lemmas.
First we show the existence of certain vectors used
in the reconstruction process.
Lemma 3 Let (K,M,ψ) be a MSP with a.s. A.
Suppose B ∈ A∩A∗ (i.e. A = P −B is in A). Then
there exists an invertible linear transformation U on
the shares of A such that after the transformation,
1. the first share contains the secret s;
2. all remaining shares, including those of players
in B, are distributed independently of s when the
e− 1 other components of s∗ are chosen at ran-
dom.
Proof: Say A contains m shares. Then we
must construct m linearly independent vectors
u1,u2, . . . ,um such that
1. u⊤1 MA
(
s
a
)
= s;
2. If U ′ is the matrix with rows given by
u2, . . . ,um, then the value(
U ′MA
MB
)(
s
a
)
is distributed independently of s.
To satisfy the first condition, pick any u1 such
that u⊤1 MA = ǫ
⊤. Such a vector must exist since
by hypothesis the players in A can reconstruct
the secret.
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To satisfy the second condition, it’s enough to
ensure there exists v such that
(
U ′MA
MB
)
v = 0
and ǫ⊤v 6= 0 (see section 2.2).
Since B ∈ A, we know that there is a v such
that ǫ⊤v 6= 0 and MBv = 0. Furthermore, the
subspace W = {u ∈ Km : u⊤MAv = 0} has
dimension m − 1, and u1 is not in that space
since u⊤1 MAv = ǫ
⊤v 6= 0. Hence any basis
{u2, . . . ,um} of W will do.
The matrix U whose rows are given by the ui’s
gives the desired transformation. Note that the
U doesn’t depend on a. ✷
Finally we show that the reconstruction process
works:
Lemma 4 Let (K,M,ψ) be a MSP and let B ∈ A∩
A∗, A = P − B. Suppose a quantum state |φ〉 =∑
s∈K αs |s〉 is encoded as described at the beginning
of this section. Then the shares in A can be used to
reconstruct |φ〉. Consequently, no information on |φ〉
can be obtained from the shares in B.
Proof: Consider the case when |φ〉 = |s〉 for some
s ∈ K. Then the encoded state can be written
∑
a∈Ke−1
∣∣∣∣MA
(
s
a
)〉 ∣∣∣∣MB
(
s
a
)〉
Construct a quantum circuit for the map b 7−→
Ub, where U is constructed as in lemma 3. De-
note by U ′ the matrix obtained by removing the
first row of U . Applying the circuit for U only
to the components of the encoded state corre-
sponding to A, we get
∑
a∈Ke−1
∣∣∣∣UMA
(
s
a
)〉 ∣∣∣∣MB
(
s
a
)〉
= |s〉 ⊗
∑
a∈Ke−1
∣∣∣∣U ′MA
(
s
a
)〉 ∣∣∣∣MB
(
s
a
)〉
However, by construction the joint distribution
of U ′MA
(
s
a
)
andMB
(
s
a
)
is independent of s when
a is chosen uniformly at random (lemma 3).
Hence, for an arbitrary state |φ〉 this procedure
yields
|φ〉 ⊗
∑
a∈Ke−1
∣∣∣∣U ′MA
(
0
a
)〉 ∣∣∣∣MB
(
0
a
)〉
By a strong form of the no cloning theorem, the
correctness of the reconstruction implies that the
shares of B give no information at all on |φ〉. ✷
(This completes the proof of theorem 2).
When the adversary structure A defined by a MSP
is Q2, we have A ⊆ A∗. Hence, the previous theorem
shows that erasures on any set of coordinates in A can
be corrected. In addition, if A is self-dual (i. e. both
Q2 and Q2∗) then the qualified sets are precisely the
complements of sets in A and hence every qualified
set can reconstruct the secret but no unqualified set
gets any information on it. Thus we have shown the-
orem 1 for the case of self-dual structures.
3.2 Mixed-state linear QSS
To handle structures which are simply Q2∗, we follow
the strategy of [4]: first extend to a self-dual structure
and then “trace-out” the new share(s).
To extend a structure A over a player set P , add a
new player to P (say τ):
Lemma 5 For any Q2∗ adversary structure A over
a player set P , the structure A′ over the set P ′ =
P ∪ {τ} given by
A′ = A ∪
{
B ∪ {τ} : B ∈ A∗
}
is self-dual and its restriction to P yields A.
Proof: Elementary, using the fact that
A is Q2∗ ⇐⇒ A∗ ⊆ A. ✷
Thus, a pure-state QSS scheme for A′ will yield a
mixed-state scheme for A by throwing out the share
corresponding to τ . For the construction to be effi-
cient, we need the following:
Lemma 6 Given a MSP for A, an MSP for A′ can
be efficiently constructed.
Proof: Note that the new access structure is Γ′ =
Γ ∪ {B ∪ {τ} : B ∈ Γ∗} (here Γ,Γ∗,Γ′ are the
complements of A,A∗,A′ resp.). Thus if f, f∗, f ′
are functions detecting membership in A,A∗,A′
respectectively, and if fτ detects the presence of
τ in a set, then f ′ = f ∨ (f∗ ∧ fτ ).
Now to construct the desired MSP, first obtain
an MSP for A∗ according to [6]. The MSP for
A′ can then be constructed by composition from
MSP’s calculating and and or. ✷
The resulting MSP is at most a constant times the
size of the original.
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4 QSS from classical SS
A natural conjecture given the results of the previous
section is that any classical secret-sharing scheme for
an adversary structure will give a quantum erasure-
coorecting for erasures in A∩A∗. I show here a con-
dition on the scheme for this to be the case. Not all
schemes satisfy the condition, though a large class of
them does, in particular group-homomorphic ones.
The corollary to this, as before, is that when A
is self-dual, the resulting quantum scheme is a qss
scheme for A. Note that the main difference between
the proof we give here and that of the preivous section
is that here we don’t guarantee that the reconstruc-
ton procedure is efficient, only that it exists and is
unitary.
4.1 A general condition
A classical secret sharing scheme can be thought of
as a probabilistic map E from a secret space S into n
“share spaces” Y1, . . . ,Yn. The random input can
be modeled as a choice from some set R with a
given probability distribution. Now consider some
set U ∈ A ∩ A∗ and let Q = U c be its complement
(Q is qualified). Let S be the random variable cor-
responding to the secret and let Yu and Yq be those
corresponding to the shares in U and Q respectively.
Denote their concatenation E(S) = Y = YuYq. Fi-
nally, let Yu,Yq be the share spaces for U and Q and
let Y = Yu × Yq be the global share space.
Note that for the SS scheme to be perfect we must
have
Correctness: H(S|Yq) = 0. Equivalently, S =
f(Yq) for some deterministic function f .
Secrecy: I(S;Yu) = 0. Equivalently, P (Yu =
yu|S = s) = P (Yu = yu|S = s
′) = P (Yu =
yu) ∀s, s
′ ∈ S.
Suppose now we have a quantum secret which is a
linear superposition of shares in S and a unitary map
E˜ such that for s ∈ S:
E˜ |s〉 =
∑
y∈Y
√
P (Y = y|S = s) |y〉
This can in fact be rewritten as
∑
yq :f(yq)=s
√
P (Yq = yq|S = s) |yq〉 ·
∑
yu∈Yu
√
P (Yu = yu|Yq = yq) |yu〉
We want to decide if this is can correct erasures on
U . To do so requires showing that the density matrix
of the U component is independent of the secret’s
state. Note that it is not sufficient to show that the
density matrix is the same for all |s〉. We have to show
this for all choices of the αs’s in
∑
s∈S αs |s〉. We can
compute the density matrix explicitly by imagining
that a measure is made on the Q component of the
code and the secret. We can then consider P (S =
s) to be |αs|
2. In what follows ρU |yq is the density
matrix of U given Yq = yq.
ρu
=
∑
s∈S
|αs|
2
∑
yq∈Yq
P (Yq = yq|S = s)ρU |yq
=
∑
yq∈Yq
P (Yq = yq)ρU |yq
=
∑
yq∈Yq
P (Yq = yq) ·

 ∑
y
(1)
u ∈Yu
√
P (Yu = y
(1)
u |Yq = yq)
∣∣∣y(1)u 〉

 ·

 ∑
y
(2)
u ∈Yu
√
P (Yu = y
(2)
u |Yq = yq)
〈
y(2)u
∣∣∣


=
∑
y
(1)
u ,y
(2)
u ∈Yu
∑
yq∈Yq
√
P (Yu = y
(1)
u , Yq = yq) ·
√
P (Yu = y
(2)
u , Yq = yq)
∣∣∣y(1)u 〉〈y(2)u ∣∣∣
The matrices in the set{∣∣∣y(1)u 〉〈y(2)u ∣∣∣ : y(1)u , y(2)u ∈ Yu}
are linearly independent. Their coefficients are
∑
yq∈Yq
√
P (Yu = y
(1)
u , Yq = yq)P (Yu = y
(2)
u , Yq = yq)
=
∑
s∈S
|αs|
2
∑
yq :f(yq)=s
√
P (Yu = y
(1)
u , Yq = yq|S = s)
√
P (Yu = y
(2)
u , Yq = yq|S = s)
For ρu to be independent of the choice of αs we must
therefore have∑
yq :f(yq)=s
√
P (Yu = y
(1)
u , Yq = yq|S = s)
√
P (Yu = y
(2)
u , Yq = yq|S = s) (1)
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independent of s for all y
(1)
u , y
(2)
u ∈ Yu. Thus
Theorem 7 Given a classical SS scheme for an
adversary structure A, the correspnding quantum
scheme corects erasures on U ∈ A ∩ A∗, iff Equa-
tion (1) is independent of s for all y
(1)
u , y
(2)
u ∈ Yu.
As unnatural as this condition seems, it is nonethe-
less satisfied by many SS schemes:
• If Yu is a function of Yq (as is the case in the
Shamir scheme) then we have the expression (1)
equal to 0 whenever y
(1)
u 6= y
(2)
u . Furthermore,
when y
(1)
u = y
(2)
u = yu the expression reduces to∑
yq:f(yq)=s
P (Yu = yu, Yq = yq|S = s), which
sums to P (Yu = yu|S = s). This is independent
of s by the secrecy assumption above. Thus this
type of scheme yields a secure QSS.
• A group homomorphic secret sharing scheme is
based on an injective homomorphism h : G ×
Gm −→ Gn for some group G. The secret s is
an element of G and the n shares are obtained
by picking v ∈R G
m and calculating h(s,v).
In this case, the independence of expression (1)
from s is guaranteed by the following fact: in
any homomorphic ss scheme, either two words
y
(1)
u , y
(2)
u never appear with the same word yq
(that is
P (Yu = y
(1)
u |Yq = yq)P (Yu = y
(2)
u |Yq = yq) = 0
for all yq) or they always appear with the same
probability:
√
P (Yu = y
(1)
u |Yq = yq)P (Yu = y
(2)
u |Yq = yq)
= P (Yu = y
(1)
u |Yq = yq).
The same analysis as before applies: qss schemes
constructed from homomorphic schemes are se-
cure. Interestingly, there seem to be no cases
where non-homomorphic schemes provide any
advantage over homomorphic ones [13].
Thus, it seems that although not all classical ss
schemes yield a qss scheme directly, the most impor-
tant ones do. However, the proof given does not give
the reconstruction procedure; it only proves its ex-
istence. It is not a priori clear that all classical SS
schemes which yield a secure QSS scheme will have
efficient (quantum) reconstruction procedures.
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